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ALLOWING ATTORNEYS TO SWING FOR
THE FENCES: THE MASSACHUSETTS
LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP ACT
INTRODUCTION
The registered limited liability partnership, otherwise known as a
"limited liability partnership" ("LLP") is a form of business enterprise
which has experienced tremendous growth and popularity since its
inception by the Texas State Legislature in 1991. 1 To date, a total of
forty-eight states, along with the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
have passed some form of LLP legislation.' On November 29, 1995,
Massachusetts joined this nationwide trend and became the forty-
eighth state to enact its own registered limited liability partnership
laws.'
This Note examines the salient features of Massachusetts General
Laws chapter 108A, section 2 et seq. (the "Massachusetts LLP Act"),
the potential effects that it might have on the practice of law within
the commonwealth, and where it fits in the national scheme of LLP
statutes. Part I of this Note examines the fundamental principles of
general partnership law under the Uniform Partnership Act (the
"UPA").^ Part II examines the history of the LLP form, specifically the
events leading up to its creation, as well as the state-specific versions
of the LLP form. 5 Part III examines some additional reasons behind
the LLP's popularity as well as other alternative forms of limiting
liability, particularly for lawyers. 6 Part IV analyzes the recently enacted
Massachusetts LLP legislation and compares some of its provisions to
those of other stales.' Finally, Part V addresses some of the various
ethical concerns created by the advent of LLPs. 8
See ALAN R. I3ROMBERG & LARRY E, RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED
LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS AND 'FHE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT 2 (1995).
2 See Limited Liallility Partnerships—A Reality, MAss, LAW. WKLY., Dec. 4,1995, at 10 [here-
inafter LLPs—A Reality].
3 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch . 108A, § 2 et seq. (West Supp. 1996).
'I See infra notes 9-42 and accompanying text,
•5
	 infra notes 43-90 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 91-126 and accompanying text
7 See infra notes 127-77 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 178-244 and accompanying text.
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I. GENERAL PARTNERSHIP PRINCIPLES
In 1982, in Mt. Wheeler Power, Inc. v. Gallagher; the Nevada Su-
preme Court held that a plaintiff electric company could bring a claim
for non-payment against the non-bankrupt general partners of a bank-
rupt company.' In Mt. Wheeler, the plaintiff, an electric company,
brought suit against the partners of a bankrupt company seeking
payment for electricity supplied while the bankrupt company had been
a debtor-in-possession under chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act.'" The
court reasoned that had the debtor-in-possession properly paid the
electric bill prior to the close of the bankruptcy proceeding, the bur-
den of payment would have been placed upon the non-bankrupt
partners of the company.n As a result, the court concluded that, as
between the plaintiff electric company and the defendant partners, the
latter should absorb the cost of the electrical power in question.' 2 Thus,
the court held that where a plaintiffs claim for payment was improp-
erly ignored prior to the closure of bankruptcy, the plaintiff could
bring a claim for payment against the non-bankrupt partners of the
bankrupt company.''
In 1984, in Dayco Corp. v. Fred T Roberts & Co., the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that where the plaintiff obtained an arbitration
award against a partnership, the plaintiff could maintain an action
against the individual partners to recover damages once the plaintiff
discovered that there was no partnership property available to satisfy
the arbitration award.' 4 In Dayco, the plaintiff obtained a two hundred
thousand dollar arbitration award against the defendant partnership
for violations of patent licensee agreements.' 5
 Having discovered that
the partnership assets were insufficient to satisfy the award, the plaintiff
instituted a recovery action against the partners themselves.'' The
court reasoned that where an action is brought against a partnership
and the result is a judgment against the partnership, a plaintiff must
first seek to satisfy the debt with the partnership's assets. 17
 The court
further reasoned that this, however, does not prevent a plaintiff from
9 653 P.2d 1212, 1213-14 (Nev. 1982).
1 ° Id. at 1213. This case was governed by the "old" Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.,
which was repealed in 1978. See id at n.1.
11
 Id. at 1215.
12 Id.
18
	 at 1213-14.
14
 472 A.2d 780, 784 (Conn. 1984).
15 1d. at 782.
16 See id.
17 Id. at 784.
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instituting suit against the individual partners to hold them liable for
the debt when the plaintiff finds the partnership without assets and its
judgment unsatisfied.'s The court concluded that to hold otherwise
would insulate partners from their joint liability for a partnership
debt.'`-' Thus, the court held that the plaintiff, having obtained an
arbitration award against a partnership, could bring suit against the
individual partners if the partnership assets were insufficient to satisfy
the judgment.21 '
In 1996, in Kansallis Finance Ltd. v. Fern, the Massachusetts Su-
preme Judicial Court held that each of the partners in a partnership
may be held vicariously liable for the unauthorized acts of a fellow
partner if that partner acts with the apparent authority of the partner-
ship or if that partner acts to benefit the partnership. 21 In Kansallis
Finance, a partner in a law firm intentionally misrepresented certain
aspects of a non-firm-related transaction in a letter written on firm
letterhead. 22
 The court reasoned that although the transaction arose
out of the partner's personal business affairs and thus, was completely
outside the business of the partnership, the partnership could never-
theless be held vicariously liable for apparently authorized conduct of
its partner even if the fellow partners were entirely unaware of and
uninvolved with that conduct.° The court reasoned that so long as a
reasonable person could find that the partner acted either under
apparent authority of the partnership or for the purpose of benefiting
the partnership, the general proposition that partners in a general
partnership are jointly and severally liable for the acts of their fellow
partners should apply. 24
 Thus, the court held that non-culpable part-
ners may be held vicariously liable for intentional misrepresentations
made by their fellow partners, provided those misrepresentations take
place under the apparent authority of the partnership or for the
purpose of benefiting the partnership. 25
Commentators have concluded that these cases illustrate one of
the perilous realities that accompany attorneys who practice in general
partnerships. 26
 Examining the facts of cases like Kansallis Finance, it is
16 Id.
19 Dayar, 472 A.2d at 784.
2" Id. at 784-85.
21
 659 N,E.2d 731, 739 (Mass. 1996).
'22 Id. at 732,
23 See id. at 732, 739.
24 Id. at 739.
25 Id.
26 See Michael Orey, The Lessons of Kaye, Seholer: Am I My Partner's Keeper?, Am, LAW., May
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easy to understand how the concept of limiting some or all of the
vicarious liability which general partners have for one another's actions
proves to be an attractive option for many attorneys. 27 To understand
exactly how a LLP accomplishes this purpose, it is first necessary to
examine some of the features of the business form from which it has
evolved—the general partnership. 28
A partnership is "an association of two or more persons to carry
on as co-owners a business for profit." 29 It is also the form of business
that is created when two or more people conduct business together
without any formalities." There are no statutory requirements for the
formation of a partnership.'" As a result, it is the default form of
organization for any business consisting of more than one owner. 32 The
relationship between partners in a general partnership is strictly one
of co-ownership and, absent contractual stipulations to the contrary,
each partner has the power to make controlling decisions involving
the business."
Commentators have noted that aside from the relative simplicity
with which partnerships can be formed and operated, the general
partnership proves an attractive form of business organization for
income tax purposes.34 Under the Internal Revenue Code (the "IRC"),
a general partnership itself does not pay taxes." Instead, it merely
passes its tax liability on to its individual partners who pay taxes only
on the income they specifically receive from the partnership."
Commentators have also suggested that the lack of formal separa-
tion between the partners and the partnership entity itself, while ben-
eficial for tax and operational purposes, is detrimental when it comes
1992, at 3; Thom Weidlich, Limiting Lawyers' Liability: LLPs Can Protect the Assets of Innocent
Partners, NAT'L Lj., Feb. 7, 1994, at 1.
27 See 659 N.E.2d at 732.
213 See UNIE. PARTNLasiiii. AcT § 15 (1914), 6 U.L.A. 456 (1995). Because of the virtual
nationwide adoption of the Uniform Partnership Act, there has been little reason for courts to
consider whether there is an internal affairs choice of law rules for partnerships. See Robert W.
Hamilton, Registered Limited Liability Partnerships: Present at the Birth (Nearly), 66 U. Coto. L.
Rev. 1065, 1075 n.28 (1995).
29 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6, 6 U.L.A. 256.
3° See White Consol. Indus., Inc. v. Waterhouse, 158 F.R.D. 429, 435 (D. Minn. 1994) (under
state law, no filing requirement for general partnerships); AIAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E.
RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIPS, § 2.01(a) (1988 & Stipp. 1997).
31 See White Consol., 158 F.R.D. at 435; BROMBERG, supra note 30, § 2.01(a).
32 See, e.g., James W. Dodge, A Brief Survey of Limited Liability Law in Illinois, 20 S. It U.
U. 247, 248 (1996); Hainaut'', supra note 28, at 1075.
33 See 8 THE GUIDE TO AMERICAN LAW 135 (West 1985).
34 Seel3ROMBERG, supra note 30, § 1.03(c) (9).
35 See id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 751(a) (1994)).
s See. id.
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to potential liability." As Kansallis Finance illustrates, under the UPA
"all partners are jointly and severally liable for any wrongful act or
omission of any partner acting in the ordinary course of business of
the partnership and for all other debts and obligations of the partner-
ship."" In other words, when someone sues a traditional general part-
nership on account of the acts or omissions of one or more of its
partners, not only are the partnership's assets subject to liability, but
so is the personal wealth of each of the partners themselves."
Leading commentators have surmised that partnerships involving
attorneys have been particularly susceptible to the increasing number
of malpractice claims and judgments occurring throughout the coun-
try.'" As a result, attorneys have been at the forefront of the LLP
movement since its adoption by the Texas State Legislature in 1991. 41
To fully understand the underlying policies which have spurred legis-
latures across the country to adopt this business organizational form,
it is necessary to examine the history and context which led up to the
creation of LLPs. 42
II. THE HISTORY OF THE LLP FORM
In 1988, in Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Gorp. v. Laurence 13.
Vineyard, fr. , the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (the
"FSLIC") and the Dallas law firm of jenkens & Gilchrist entered into
an eighteen million dollar settlement agreement in which the firm did
not admit liability.° The FSLIC sought damages of one hundred mil-
lion dollars, alleging that a former partner of the firm had used his
position as a savings and loan ("S&L") attorney to obtain loans that
contributed to the collapse of two separate S&Ls. 44
 The FSLIC claimed
that each of the named defendants were vicariously liable for the acts
of their fellow partner.° Instead of trying the case on the merits,
37 See Orey, supra note 25, at 3; Weidlich, supra note 26, at 1.
58
 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, §§ 13-15 (Stipp, 1995); see Kansallis Finance, 659 N.E.2d at
739.
59 See. MAss.	 1.Aws ch. 108A, § 15(h) (Supp. 1995); Kansallis Finance, 659 N.E.2t1 at 739.
4() See Jennifer J. Johnson, The Oregon Limited Liability Partnership Act, 32 WILL/um:TIT L.
REA/. 147,147 (1996); Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice: The. Profession's Dirty Little Secret, 47
VAign. t.. REv. 1657,1664-70 (1994).
41 See. BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 2; Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1069-71.
42
 See infra notes 43-90 and accompanying text.
45 See. Diane Burch & Amy Boardman, MC Opens New Front in S&L Mr: Aggressive Suit
Filed in Wake off&C's $6 Million Malpractice Loss, TEL LAW., Mar. 26,1990, at 1.
44
 See Suit Seeks $100 Million From Attorneys Who Represented Failed Thrills, U1'1, June 18,
1987, available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
45 See id.
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Jenkens & Gilchrist and the FSLIC entered into an eighteen million
dollar settlement agreement, in which the firm did not admit to any
wrongdoing. 45
The FSLIC also brought suit against other law firms." By the end
of 1989, the FSLIC had initiated actions against more than a dozen law
firms which had represented various collapsed S&Ls across the nation.
In one case, the FSLIC won a thirty-five million dollar verdict against
a Louisiana law firm."
In each of these cases the FSLIC was able to tap into the multi-
million dollar insurance policies and assets of the various firms under
the theory that all partners are vicariously liable for the acts and
omissions of their fellow partners. 49 In United States v. Vineyard, for
example, only one Jenkens & Gilchrist partner, Laurence B. Vineyard,
was responsible for malpractice in his dealings with two separate
S&Ls.5° Furthermore, Vineyard had left Jenkens & Gilchrist in 1983, a
full three years before either of the S&Ls in question collapsed. 5 '
Nevertheless, forty-six present and former Jenkens & Gilchrist part-
ners, many of whom had no involvement in or even knowledge of
Vineyard's dealings, were forced to pay eighteen million dollars to
settle the suit with the government. 52
It was against this backdrop that three Texas lawyers, James H.
Milam, Philip W. Johnson and Robert L. Duncan proposed, and State
Senator John Montford introduced, Senate Bill 302 in the 72nd Texas
Legislature." The bill called for the amendment of the joint and
several liability portion of Texas' version of the UPA to give partners
permanent protection from vicarious liability. 54 After some debate, an
amended version of this bill passed both the Texas Senate and House
of Representatives. 55
48 See Burch, 514pro note 43, at 1; Mark Tatge, FSLIC, Jenkens & Gilchrist Settle Lawsuit, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Aug. 15, 1989, at ID.
47 See Linda P. Campbell, U.S. Suing to Recoup S&L Losses, CHL TRIB., Nov. 20, 1989, at 3;
Wayne E. Green, Alleging Negligence, the FSLIC Is Suing Many of the Attorneys for Failed Thrifts,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 1989; Marianne Lavelle, For the Sins of Their S&L Clients: 15 FSLIC Lawsuits
Name Firms, NAT'L 1,1., May 8, 1989, at 3.
48 See FSLIC v. John A. Mmahat, No. 86-5160, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14374 at *2 (E.D. La.
Dec. 19, 1988).
49 See Campbell, supra note 47, at 3.
58
 United States v. Vineyard, 699 F. Supp. 103, 104 (N.D. Tex. 1988).
51 See Green, supra note 47.
52 See Burch, supra note 43, at 1.
53 See BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 2.
54 See id. w 4; Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1073.
55 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1073.
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This original version of the Texas statute provided that:
A partner in a registered limited liability partnership is not
individually liable for debts and obligations of the partnership
arising from errors, omissions, negligence, incompetence, or
malfeasance committed in the course of the partnership busi-
ness by another partner or a representative of the partnership
not working under the supervision or direction of the first
partner at the time the errors, omissions, negligence, incom-
petence, or malfeasance occurred . . . 56
The statute provided that these provisions did not affect the joint
and several liability of a partner for debts and obligations of the
partnership arising from any cause other than those previously
specified and did not affect the liability of partnership assets for
partnership debts and obligations." Furthermore, the original
Texas LLP statute required that any registered limited liability part-
nership must include the letters "LLP" in its name and must carry,
"if reasonably available," one hundred thousand dollars worth of
malpractice insurance.68
While this original version of the Texas LLP statute was extremely
popular, it was soon revised in order to address some of the difficulties
which the language of the statute created in practice." The revised
statute mainly dealt with the insurance provision.° Specifically, it took
out the phrase "if reasonably available" and provided that a LLP may
establish a trust or fund in lieu of an insurance policy which could be
used to satisfy the one hundred thousand dollar liability coverage
requirement. 6'
The revised statute also amended the original with respect to the
concept of supervisory liability. 62
 The original statute mandated that a
partner who had knowledge or notice of another partner's misconduct
would be held vicariously liable for an action that arose from that
56 TEX. REV. C1V. STAT. ANN, ;111.. 6132b, § 15(2) (West Supp. 1997).
51 See id.
58 See id. §§ 45—B, 45—C.
5" See id. § 3.08(a) (1) (West Supp. 1997); BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 6. Specifically, the
insurance provision of the original statute needed to be reworded because the insurance policies
often used language different from the exclusive list of actions in the statute. See BROMBERG,
supra note 1, at 6.
86 See 'Mx. REv. C1v. STAT. ANN. art. 61321), § 3.08(15)(d) (West Supp. 1997).
61 See id.
62
 See id.
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conduct." The revised version of the statute amended this rule so that
partners who had knowledge of the errors or omissions of another
would not be held liable if that partner took reasonable steps to
prevent or cure them."
While Texas was in the process of revising the 1991 version of its
LLP legislation, Louisiana, North Carolina, Delaware and the District
of Columbia all adopted LLP statutes based upon the Texas model,
each with its own variations. 65 Several observers noted that the Dela-
ware statute's variations provided the most significant alterations to the
Texas mode1.66 This statute added several provisions that provided
more protection to non-culpable partners."
The Delaware statute extended the amount of protection afforded
to non-culpable partners in several ways." First, it used the terms
"wrongful acts or misconduct" to describe the types of partner wrong-
doing for which non-culpable partners were not liable. 69 This stood in
contrast to the narrower terms of the Texas act which protected non-
culpable partners from only the "errors, omissions, negligence, incom-
petence, or malfeasance" of fellow partners." Second, the Delaware
statute limited which partners may be held liable for supervising those
persons who committed wrongful acts. 7 ' Specifically, the act mandated
that such partners be in a position of "direct supervision or control"
to expose themselves to any vicarious liability, rather than simply in a
position of "supervision or direction," as provided in the Texas stat-
ute. 72 Third, the Delaware statute specifically authorized its LLPs to act
out of state, expressing the policy that in such cases Delaware law
should govern." No similar provision appeared in the Texas act. 74
In 1994, the Delaware State Legislature amended its LLP statute,
providing even more protection for non-culpable partners." First, they
15 See id. § 15 (2) (b) (West Supp. 1997).
64 See id. § 3.08(1)(a).
65 See. BROMBERG, SUPTa note 1, at 9.
615 See id.; Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1078-79.
67 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1502 et seq. (1993).
68 See id.
69 See id. § 1515(b).
7° Compare id., with TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15 (West Supp. 1997).
71 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515(c) (1993).
72 Compare id., with Ti x, REv, Civ. SLAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15(2).
73 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1547(b) (1993). Commentators have stressed the importance
of this provision because, under traditional partnership principals, a partnership that enters into
a transaction is subject to the partnership laws of the state in which the transaction occurred. See
State v. Ritholz, 100 N.W.2d 722, 729 (Minn. 1960).
74 See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15.
75 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515 (Stipp. 1996).
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broadened the protected activity to include misconduct "whether char-
acterized in tort, contract or otherwise." 7" Second, the revision clarified
the extent of non-culpable partners' protection from indirect liability
by mandating that such partners are not liable "either directly or
indirectly, by way of indemnification, contribution, assessment or oth-
erwise" for the otherwise protected misconduct."
Also, during 1994, thirteen more states adopted LLP provisions. 78
Most of these were modeled closely after either the Texas or Delaware
mode1. 7" Two states, however, New York and Minnesota, adopted LLP
statutes which made major alterations to the original LLP models."
These changes centered around a provision in the New York and
Minnesota statutes which not only protects non-culpable partners from
the wrongful acts or omissions of their fellow partners, but also shields
all partners from vicarious liability for virtually all ordinary business
obligations of the partnership entity
The New York statute provides:
[Mt) partner . . . is liable or accountable, directly or indi-
rectly (including by way of indemnification, contribution or
otherwise), for any debts, obligations or liabilities of, or
chargeable to, the registered limited liability partnership or
each other, whether arising in tort, contract or otherwise .
solely by reason of being such a partner
	 . . 82
Commentators have suggested that, while this language provides
broader protection for partners than either the Texas or Delaware
statutes, a partner in a New York LLP still remains liable for his or
her own wrongful acts as well as those of persons under his or her
direct supervision or control." Finally, the New York statute allows
only for general partnerships which engage in the rendering of
professional services to register as LLPs."
76 See id. This provision prevented clever plaintiffs from successfully circumventing the statute
by characterizing a malpractice claim as an implied breach of contract, rather than as a tort such
as negligence. See Hamilton, supra note '18, at 1078.
" See Del.. Gone ANN. lit 6, § 1515.
7H See Mom liERG, Mina note 1, at 11.
7t1 See id.
6" See id.
HI See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.19(2) (West 1995); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(b) (McKinney
Stapp. 1097); BRONIBERG, MOM note 1, at 11-12.
82 N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(b).
143
 See BROMISERG, supra note 1, at 12; Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1089.
84
 See BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 12. Compare N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(b), with Tex. Rev.
CIV, STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08 (West Stipp. 1907).
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Like the New York statute, the Minnesota statute provides partners
with protection against ordinary debts and business obligations of the
partnership.85 Unlike the New York statute, however, the Minnesota
statute provides that this protection can be overridden by "piercing the
veil" on the same grounds used in corporate law.86 The Minnesota
statute also imposes liability on partners who receive distributions
greater than would have been allowed if the LLP were a corporation
subject to prohibition of distributions when insolvent.87
During the past two years over thirty states have adopted some
form of LLP legislation. 88 The expanded protection which the New
York and Minnesota statutes provide has dramatically affected the ways
in which these states have developed their own statues. 89 The New York
and Minnesota statutes are credited with beginning a trend in LLP law
towards providing partners with broader protection than the original
Texas and Delaware models."°
III. POPULARITY AND GROWTH OF THE LLP
The LLP is not the only liability limiting form of business organi-
zation available to attorneys practicing in general partnerships."' The
number of law firms switching over to the LLP form, however, has
increased exponentially in the past few years. 92 Commentators have
credited the LLP's popularity with law firms to the fact that it allows
partners to receive all the benefits that they were accustomed to receiv-
ing as a general partnership, while it eliminates most of the liability
exposure which they faced as partners in a general partnership."
The primary benefit of general partnerships which LLPs share is
a favorable tax status with the federal government."' In fact, for federal
income tax purposes, the I.R.S. considers an LLP as a continuation of
85 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(2); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(b).
86 Compare MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(3), with N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(b).
87 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(5) (referring to § 302A.551, permitting distributions "only
if the board determines ... that the corporation will be able to pay its debts in the ordinary
course of business after making the distribution").
88 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1065 (as of beginning of 1995, 25 states had enacted LLP
legislation); LLPs—A Reality, supra note 2, at 10 (as of December 1995, 47 states had enacted
LLP legislation).
86 See BRomBERG, supra note 1, at 13-14.
See id.
91 See BuomBERG, supra note 30, § 1.01(h); Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1066 n.3.
52 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1065.
"See, e.g., Mark A. Cohen, Law Firms Registering as LLPs in Droves: Attorneys Cite Broad
Benefits of Status, MASS. LAW. WKLY., June 10, 1996, at 1.
94 See BkomBERc., supra note 1, at 192-93 (citing Internal Revenue Code provisions).
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the general partnership from which it converted. 95 Thus, partners in
LLPs are not taxed on income earned in the partnership— rather,
partners incur a tax on liability only on their portion of the distribu-
tions.96
The second aspect of LLPs which has helped to contribute to their
growth and popularity with law firms is the fact that they allow the
partners to maintain the same management structure as they had as a
general partnership.`''' Managing partners of law firms have stated that
one of the biggest reasons firms had not previously chosen to adopt a
liability limiting organizational form was the fear that the change in
structure might disrupt the collegiality and working relationships that
members of a general partnership have come to enjoy." Because reg-
istering as a LLP does not affect the management structure of the law
firm, these partners report that the switch to LLP status goes virtually
unnoticed by both the partners and the employees of the partnership.° 9
Examining the salient features of some of the other liability limit-
ing business organizational forms which general partnership law firms
could adopt helps illustrate why many law firms have chosen to adopt
the LLP form.um Specifically, the corporation, limited partnership and
limited liability company are all viable alternatives for a law firm seek-
ing to limit its vicarious liability for the acts and omissions of its
partners." While the availability of some of these options varies from
state to state, law firms in virtually every state have the option of
adopting a liability limiting form of business organization other than
the LLP. 1 °2
Seeking to avoid the potential limitless liability inherent in the
general partnership, a law firm could incorporate. 1 p3 Unlike a partner-
95 See Priv. Ur. Ruls. 94-48-025 (Aug. 31,1994), 94-23-040 (Mar. 19, 1994), 94-20-028 (Feb.
18, 1994); New York Registered LIP Given Partnership 71'eatment for Federal 'Mx, j, Oct.,
1995, at 232 [hereinafter New York Registered upi.
See Priv. Lt.. Rubs. 94-48-025,94-23-040,94-20-028; New York Registered LLP, supra note
95, at 232.
97
 See Cohen, supra note 93, Si I.
98 See id.
9J
	id.
iw See infra notes 103-26 and accompanying text.
111 I See Dodge, supra note 32, at 248-50.
1192 See N. Scott Murphy, Note, It's Nothing Personal: The Public Costs of Limited Liability Law
Partnerships, 71 IND. L.J. 201,208 n.42 (1995).
"See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156A, § 2 et seq. (1994 & Stipp. 1995). Certain states, such as
Massachusetts, require businesses wishing to incorporate to do so as either a standard business
corporation or as a professional corporation (the "PC"). See MASS. CONTINUING LEGAL. Entic.,
How To INCORPORATE AND COUNSEL A BusiNess, 27-34 (1996) [hereinafter MCLE]. In these
states, law firms wishing to incorporate must adopt. the (Orin of a PC. See id. While in most respects
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ship, a corporation is an entity which rests apart from its owners.'°' This
separation between the owners and the partnership provides a benefit
to the owners by limiting, in most cases, the amount of the owner's
liability to the amount that he or she has invested in the business." As
a result, the personal assets of the corporation are usually not within
the reach of anyone seeking to sue the corporation. 10° Commentators
have noted that this insulation from liability, however, comes with two
significant drawbacks.'" First, corporations require a different manage-
ment structure than partnerships.'"8
 Because most law firms have tra-
ditionally practiced as general partnerships, partners have been wary
that such a change in management structure would disrupt the social
dynamic and working relationships of those at the firm." Second,
commentators have suggested that a corporation's separate existence
from its owners proves detrimental for tax purposes."° A corporation
which does not meet the I.R.S.'s strict definition of an "S" corporation
must report and pay taxes on its income before it distributes that income
to its owners."' In turn, the shareholders themselves must report their
share of the earnings as income which itself is taxed." 2 While the
structure of a corporation provides some benefits to its owners in terms
of limiting the owners' liability, it comes at the price of changing a law
firm's management structure and in many instances incurring "double
taxation."" 3
Another business entity which addresses the issue of potential
limitless liability inherent in a general partnership is the limited part-
nership ("LP"). 14
 The LP is different from a general partnership or a
these two entities are similar, commentators have noted that the PC is slightly more restrictive in
terms of shareholder liability. See id. The PC, like the standard business corporation, shields
shareholders from liability for the wrongful acts of other shareholders. See id. Shareholders in
professional corporations, however, who ;ire engaged in the rendering of prolessicmal services,
remain liable for their own professional malpractice. See id. For purposes of this Note, the term
"corporation" refers to both standard business corporations as well as professional corporations.
L04
 See BuomisEuc, supra note 30, § 1.01(6).
1115 See Id.
wfi See id.
1°7 See Murphy, supra note 102, at 210-11.
108
 See MCLE, supra note 103, at 27-33.
1°1/ See id.; Mark A. Cohen, "Limited Liability" Option for Firms Near: Could Replace Y.C. as
Preferred Statute, MASS. LAW. WKLY., July 3, 1995, at 1.
,'° See Dodge, supra note 32, at 249; Cohen, supra note 109, at 1.
111 26 U.S.C. § 1361(b) (1) (1994). In general, "S" corporations may not have more than
thirty-five shareholders, all shareholders must be individuals, shareholders may not be non-resi-
dent aliens and the corporation must. have only one class of stock. See id.
I 12 See id. § 301(a), (c) (1994).
113 See id.; Dodge, supra note 32, at 249.
111 See BROMBERG, supra note 30, § 1.01(6) (3).
September 1997]	 LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIP ACT	 961
corporation in that it has a two-tiered ownership structure." 5 The first
class of partners, the general partners, maintain the same personal
liability as partners in a general partnership. In other words, these
partners remain jointly and severally liable for all debts of the partner-
ship."" These general partners also control most or all of the LP's
day-to-day operations. 17 The second class of partners, the limited part-
ners, remain insulated from liability in much the same way as share-
holders in a corporation.t' 5 The limited partners, however, have little
or no control over the operation of the LP."• Commentators have
suggested that, because general partners are typically the active man-
agers of the LP and the limited partners are typically passive investors,
the relationship between the two classes of partners tends to he more
financial and less personal than the relations among partners in gen-
eral partnership law firms.' 2"
The registered limited liability company ("LLC") is still another
form of business organization available in several states.m The LLC
derives many of its characteristics from a range of other business
enterprises. 122 It can most accurately be described as a hybrid between
a corporation and a limited partnership.' 25 Unlike a LP, a LLC has only
one class of ownership.' 24 In terms of liability, however, the LLC insu-
lates these owners in much the same way as a corporation does for its
shareholders. 125 Moreover, for federal income tax purposes, LLC's have
the opportunity to receive the beneficial tax treatment afforded to
general and limited partnerships provided that the LLC abides by
certain I.R.S. operational guidelines.' 26
IV. THE MASSACHUSETTS STATUTE
On November 29, 1995, Massachusetts Governor William Weld
signed House Bill number 4045 (codified by Massachusetts General
115 See id.
116 See id.
117 See id.
118 See id.
See. BROMBERG, supra note 30, § 1.01(b) (3).
120 See id.
121 See id, Unlike corporations or limited partnerships, the LLC was not available in Massa-
chusetts prior to the commonwealth's adoption of its LLP laws. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156G,
§ 2 (1995). Nevertheless, had the LLP legislation not been introduced, LLCs may well have
proven an attractive option for some law firms. See Murphy, supra note 102, at 211.
122 See BROMBERG, sukra mite 30, § L01 ( 3)( 3)-
120 See id.
124 See id,
12r' See id.
126 See Rev. Rul. 1988-2 C.B. 360; Dodge, supra note 32, at 250.
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Laws chapter 108A, section 6 et seq.) into law, making Massachusetts
the forty-eighth state to enact some form of LLP legislation.' 27 The bill
was sponsored by the Boston Bar Association (the "BBA"), an organi-
zation that had attempted to bring LLPs to the commonwealth as early
as 1993. 128 Previous to the enactment of this LLP bill, the only liability
limiting option available to law firms in Massachusetts was the profes-
sional corporation ("PC").`"
The BBA's argument in favor of adopting LLPs in the common-
wealth was that Massachusetts needed such a form to stay competitive
with the forty-seven other states which had already enacted some form
of LLP legislation.'" The BBA claimed that because Massachusetts
lacked LLPs and LLCs, businesses were hesitant to establish strong
business ties in the commonwealth. 131 Because the addition of these
liability limiting forms would potentially make Massachusetts a more
attractive state in which to operate a business, many of the bill's sup-
porters predicted that the legislature's adoption of H.B. No. 4045
would have a positive effect on the Massachusetts economy. 132
A. Structure of the Statute
Like the majority of states which have passed LLP legislation,
Massachusetts created its LLP legislation by both amending and adding
to the provisions of the commonwealth's version of the UPA.'" Com-
mentators have suggested that incorporating the LLP provisions into
the same body of statutory law which governs partnerships in general
establishes the fact that the LLP form is firmly rooted in the principals
of traditional partnership law.' 34 Consequently, issues associated with
the LLP form are analyzed through the general framework of partner-
ship law itself.' 35
B. Nature of a Partner's Liability
The main exceptions to the UPA, of course, are the provisions
governing the nature of partner liability in a LLP. 136 These provisions
127 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 108A, § 2 et seq.; Cohen, supra note 109, at 1; LLPs—A
Reality, supra note 2, at 10.
128 See LLPs—A Reality, supra note 2, at 10.
129 See Cohen, supra note 109, at 1.
13° See id.; 1.I.Ps—A Reality, supra note 2, at 10.
131 See Cohen, supra note 109, at 1.
1  See id.
"3 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 2 et seq; BROMBERG, Supra note 1, at 26.
"4 See BROMBERG, supra note I, at 14.
"s See id.
136 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 15; BROMBERG, supra note 1, at 15.
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limit, but do not eliminate, the personal liabilities of Massachusetts
attorneys practicing under the LLP form."? Partners in Massachusetts
LLPs remain directly liable for their own personal negligence, wrong-
ful acts and omissions.' 38 In other words, partners in a LLP who commit
malpractice, or some other wrongful act, are compelled to pay the
damages award with funds drawn from their personal wealth.'" Unlike
the LLP laws of many other states, however, the Massachusetts statute
does not contain a provision holding partners liable for the acts and
omissions of employees over which they had direct or supervisory
control.")
The bulk of the protection provided by the Massachusetts LLP
legislation comes in the form of protection from vicarious liability for
the negligent or wrongful acts of other partners."' This provision
contains the language which underscores the entire philosophy behind
the LLP. 192 The relevant section states in part that "a partner in a
limited liability partnership shall not be personally liable directly or
indirectly, including, without limitation . for debts, obligations and
liabilities of or chargeable to such partnership whether in tort, contract
or otherwise . . . . "145 This provision illustrates the fact that, in adopting
its LLP legislation, the Massachusetts legislature followed the New York
and Minnesota model instead of the original model pioneered by
Texas and Delaware." 4
Consequently, this section shields partners not only from malprac-
tice and other wrongful acts of fellow partners, but also frees all part-
ners from contributing to the ordinary business debts and obligations
of the partnership.'" Such broad protection, not only against malprac-
tice and other such claims but also against debts of the partnership
itself accrued during the course of operating the business, was not
included in the original LLP statutes passed by Texas and Delaware in
the early nineties."'
1 " See. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 15.
138 See id.
1 " See id.
110 See id.; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515 (1993 & Supp. 1996) (partners liable for
acts and omissions of employees over which they had direct control); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 323.14(2) (West 1995) (same); N.Y. PARTNEttstm. LAW § 26(b) (McKinney Stipp. 1997) (same);
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08 (West Supp. 1997) (same).
141 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 15.
14 '2 See id.
143fd .
144 See id.; Cohen, supra note 109, at 1.
145 See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 15(2).
I46 See supra notes 53-77 and accompanying text.
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Specifically, the Massachusetts LLP act is most closely modeled on
the Minnesota LLP act, for it contains a provision limiting partners in
professional service partnerships, such as law firms, from using this
additional protection afforded by the statute to deliberately withhold
payment of ordinary business obligations. 147 The impact of this provi-
sion, which deals directly with law firms organized as LLPs, will be
discussed in more detail later on in this Note. 148
It is also important to note that the liability shield of the LLP
applies only to obligations incurred while the partnership is actually
registered as an LLP. 149
 Partners continue to have the same general
partnership liability over matters that occurred before the partnership
registered as an LLP, and for events which occur after the partnership
ceases to practice as a LLP.'"
C. Formation of a LLP in Massachusetts
Massachusetts LLPs are subject to regulation by the Secretary of
State's office.' 51
 A general partnership can register with the Secretary
of State's office as a LLP by filling out and submitting forms providing,
among other things, the name of the partnership, a list stating the
names of all the partners rendering professional services, the street
address if the partnership's principal office is within the common-
wealth and a brief statement of the business or profession in which the
partnership engages. 152
 One or more of the partners, approved by a
majority vote, must personally execute the registration.' 53
 Along with
1 '17 Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, 15(4), with MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(3). Section
15 of Massachusetts LLP Act states: "the personal liability of a partner in a limited liability
partnership engaged in the rendering of professional services shall not be less than the personal
liability of a shareholder in a professional corporation . . engaged in rendering the same
professional services." MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 15(4).
1 " See infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text. As with other ethical considerations that
attorneys encounter in everyday practice, the law" only sets the outer boundaries as to what is
permissible. See Mass. SIC R. 3:06 (1996). In the case of limited liability partnerships, the extent
that a Massachusetts law firm can limit its own liability is determined by the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court. See a In 1996, the court updated court rule 3:06, dealing with limbed
liability entities, to include limited liability partnerships and limited liability companies. See id. In
this opinion, the court did not seem to place any significant restrictions above and beyond the
language of the actual statute. See id. As a result, all of the potential problems that may arise with
the broad protection provided by the Massachusetts legislation are directly applicable to Massa-
chusetts law firms. See id.
119 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 15(2).
IS" See id.
151 See id. § 45.
152 See id.
155
 See Id.
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the registration, the partnership must provide a registration fee of five
hundred dollars.' 51
To maintain the status of the partnership as a LLP, the partnership
must file an annual report by the last day of February of each year.' 55
The annual report does not differ significantly in form or substance
from the original registration and it too must be accompanied by a five
hundred dollar administrative fee. 156 This provision proves, in effect,
to amount to an annual re-registration. 157 If the partnership fails to
submit an annual report and fee by the filing date, the Secretary of
State must provide sixty days notice of the State's intention to revoke
the partnership's LLP status.' 58 If upon the passing of the sixty day
period the partnership has not submitted the report and paid the
corresponding fee, the Secretary of State's office may revoke the part-
nership's LLP standing.' 5"
Aside from failing to submit an annual report and fee with the
Secretary of State's office, a partnership may withdraw its LLP status
by a two-thirds majority vote of the partners.'6° To execute a valid
withdrawal, one or more of the partners must file a written notice of
withdrawal with the Secretary of State's office.'"' A fee of one hundred
dollars must accompany the execution of the withdrawal notice.' 62
The Massachusetts statute provides that once a partnership regis-
ters as a LLP with the Secretary of State's office, the name of the
partnership must reflect this fact. 163 Specifically, section 47 of the Mas-
sachusetts LLP Act mandates that "the name of every registered limited
liability partnership shall end with the words 'registered limited liability
partnership,' `limited liability partnership,' or the abbreviation `L.L.P.'
or 'LLP.'"'" This provision, which appears in the LLP statutes of every
state, gives notice to outside parties as to the partnership's status as an
LLP.''"
Like the Texas and Delaware statutes, the Massachusetts LLP act
contains a provision requiring that the LLP carry a designated amount
154 See MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. IVf1A, § 45.
155 See id.
155 See id.
157 See id.
I" See id
'w See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 45.
I" See id.
11,1 See id.
"i2 See id.
163 See id. § 46.
MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. INA, § 46.
"35 See id.
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of insurance designed to cover the types of claims from which the
statute shields the partners from personal liability.' 66
 This provision,
however, only applies to partnerships which provide professional serv-
ices as defined in Massachusetts General Laws chapter 156A.' 67 The
statute mandates that the particular amount of insurance necessary in
each case shall be determined by the regulating boards which regulate
the particular professional services rendered.' 68
D. Multi-State Practice
Many businesses, including many law firms, conduct business in
several different offices located in various states. Because each state's
LLP laws vary to some degree, especially in those states which, as of
yet, have not enacted some form of LLP legislation, conflicts of laws
issues arise. 169
 The Massachusetts LLP provisions address these issues
with respect to LLPs based here in Massachusetts, as well as with LLPs
formed under the laws of another state. 17°
Section 2 the Massachusetts LLP Act defines a foreign limited
liability partnership as "a registered limited liability partnership or
limited liability partnership formed pursuant to an agreement gov-
erned by the laws of another jurisdiction." 17 I The Massachusetts statute
requires all foreign limited liability partnerships doing business within
the commonwealth to register with the Massachusetts Secretary of
State's office in the same manner as Massachusetts-based LLPs 12 The
"internal affairs" of such foreign limited liability partnerships are to be
governed by the laws of the jurisdiction where the foreign limited
liability partnership is registered. 173
 Foreign LLPs are, however, subject
to the Massachusetts identification requirement, or the identification
requirement of the state in which it is registered if such a requirement
exists on the books.'"
Similarly, section 47 of the Massachusetts LLP Act intends that any
Massachusetts LLP engaging in business outside the state should be
recognized as a LLP pursuant to the full faith and credit clause of the
166 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1546 (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 45; TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(15) (Stipp. 1997).
167 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 45(8).
16" See id.
160 See BuomnERG, supra note 1, at 150-51.
17t'See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 47.
L71 Id § 2.
172 See id. § 47(4).
173 See id. § 47(6).
174
 See id. § 47(5).
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United States Constitution. 175
 Furthermore, the Massachusetts statute
also mandates that the "internal affairs" of any LLP formed pursuant
to this legislation be exclusively subject to the laws of this common-
wealth."' These provisions all but eliminate any issues over which law
should govern both Massachusetts-based LLPs operating in other states
as well as foreign LLPs operating in Massachusetts.'"
V. ANALYSIS
Examining the provisions of the various LLP statutes, it is easy to
see why they have been received with such enthusiasm by the legal
community, especially partners in law firms." 8 While the amount of
protection provided by LLPs varies from state to state, in virtually all
cases, partners in LLPs are in a better position (from a liability per-
spective) than they were when organized as a general partnership."'
The only real costs that these attorneys must bear in return for this
increased protection are, in most states, annual filing and administra-
tive fees.' 8° These benefits, however, pose serious and less advertised
costs on society."' In order to determine how much protection LLPs
should grant non-culpable partners, it is necessary to examine more
closely how the LLP shield operates in a situation where the firm faces
a potentially disastrous malpractice judgment. 182
A. Consequences of a Lawsuit Under the Texas/Delaware Provisions
The original conception behind the LLP embodied in the Texas
and Delaware statutes was to provide non-culpable partners protection
against losing their personal assets in one particular circumstance.'"
173 See MASS. GEN. LAWS Ch. 108A § 47(2).
176 See id. § 47(3).
177 See id. § 47.
178
 See Lisa Isom-Rodriguez, Limiting the Perils of Partnership, Am. LAW., July-Aug. 1993, at 30.
These days big-firm partners are looking to registered limited liability partner-
ships ... with an enthusiasm perhaps more appropriately reserved by the Holy
Grail, says Michael Bohnen, a partner at Boston's 117-lawyer Nutter, McGtermen &
Fish, who has written an UP bill that is pending in the Massachusetts legislature.
The Grail may have promised ultimate wisdom, but LLPs promise to protect it
partner's personal assets from claims levied against another partner clown die hall,
or on the other side of the world.
Id.
179 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1065.
ISO See MASS. GEN. LAWS Cll. 108A, § 45.
181 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1093-94.
182 See infra notes 56-77 and accompanying text.
183 See id.
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That circumstance dealt exclusively with a situation where a malprac-
tice judgment was entered against another of their partners.' 84
 In this
respect the LLP was originally viewed as a kind of "death insurance,"
only to be used to protect partners' personal assets upon the financial
collapse of the partnership.'"
Because LLP statutes constructed under the Texas/Delaware
model are narrowly tailored to protect only non-culpable partners,
when a LLP organized under one of these statutes faces a malpractice
suit, the different partners have different liabilities.'" As a result, it is
natural to assume that each group of partners will want to defend a
suit in a way which best addresses its own concerns.'"' Consequently,
the fact that each group of partners is likely to look out for its own best
interests causes disunity and tension among the attorneys, making it
extremely difficult for the firm to defend such a suit.'"
To understand exactly how the different interests of the partners
come into tension and conflict with one another, it is necessary to
examine the extent to which the LLP shield affects the different part-
nership and the partnership entity itself. First, non-culpable partners
only receive protection from debts directly or indirectly attributed to
another partner's or representative's malpractice.'" Second, the shield
does not protect partners who have control over or knowledge of
another's wrongful acts and fail to prevent or cure the problem."'
Third, the assets of the partnership entity itself are always available to
satisfy a judgment.' 91 Finally, upon the exhaustion of the firm's assets,
culpable partners must use their own personal wealth to satisfy the
balance of the malpractice claim. 392
It is important to note that by the time culpable partners are
forced to satisfy a claim out of their own wealth, the firm itself will have
in most cases already collapsed.'" The limited amount of insurance
provided by the LLP form served its purpose by saving the personal
wealth of the non-culpable partners.' 94 Because it has done nothing,
184 See id.
188'
	 Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1077; Weidlich, supra note 26, at I.
1418
 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1079.
197 See id.
189 See id.
1 k9.1 See DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 6. § 1515(1)) (1993); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b,
§ 3.08(a) (West Stipp. 1997).
190 See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515(c); TEN. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(a).
191 See DEL. CODE ANN. di. 6, § 1515(c); TEx. Rev. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(a) (2) (B).
192 See Dn.. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1515(c); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(a).
193 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1077.
194 See id.
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however, to prevent the loss of the entire firm, the non-culpable and
culpable partners alike lose the source of their livelihood until they
can find other employment.
Regardless of what happens to the law firm after it satisfies the
malpractice judgment, all the partners, culpable and non-culpable
alike, are still jointly and severally liable for any other business obliga-
tions of the firm.'•• As a result, all of the partners may be compelled
to contribute to the partnership's capital account, either to stay in
business or to satisfy contractual claims with various creditors.' 9" Such
contributions, while traceable to the malpractice claim, are technically
contributions to the partnership and not to the plaintiff in the mal-
practice case. Thus, they may not be covered by the LLP statute since
they are not payments of the malpractice claim itself. 197
Faced with these issues, consider first the incentives of the culpa-
ble partners. Obviously, they desire that the partnership reserve the
majority of its assets in order to satisfy the malpractice judgment.' 98
This may increase the amount of ordinary business expenses left un-
paid when the partnership assets are exhausted. Since all of the part-
ners, however, are equally liable for these expenses, each will have to
contribute towards them. 199 To the extent that this happens, the per-
sonal wealth of the non-culpable partners is reduced as an indirect,
but wholly tangible result of the malpractice claim. 2°0
As one might expect, the non-culpable partners involved in this
scenario have quite a different set of objectives. Faced with the possi-
bility of a significant malpractice judgment, the non-culpable partners
would in all likelihood want to cover and in some cases even prepay
the bulk of the partnership's ordinary business obligations with the
firms assets before dealing with the malpractice issue. 20 ' Consequently,
if after paying off the partnership's ordinary business obligations, there
is a deficiency of partnership funds to satisfy the malpractice judgment,
the culpable partners would have the respOnsibility of paying it off with
their own personal wealth. 2°2
 Furthermore, as partnership policy, non-
culpable partners may prefer to have the bulk of the partnership's
195 See DEI.. CODE ANN. Ch. 6, § 1515(a); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(b).
196 See Du.. CODE ANN. Ill. 6, , 1515(a); T. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 3.08(b).
197 See I)u.. Conic ANN. Lit. 6, § 1515(a); 11:x. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 61326, § 3.08(1));
Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1077.
198
 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1079-80.
199 see. id.
200 See id.
2° 1 See id.. at 1080.
2°2 See id.
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assets distributed among the partners instead of being retained by the
partnership to cover expenses on the theory that once the assets have
been distributed to the individual partners they are out of the grasp
of potential malpractice plaintiffs. 203
Regardless of how the partners choose to allocate the partnership
assets under this scenario, there is always the possibility that one or
more of the partnership's creditors will suffer an injustice. Arguably,
this would most often occur in the case where the non-culpable part-
ners seek to expend all the partnership assets on business expenses
and partner distributions to avoid paying a malpractice judgment. The
plaintiff would probably only have access to the partnership's mal-
practice insurance and the personal assets of the culpable partner or
partners.204
 It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which this proves
too shallow a pocket to justify a plaintiffs loss. In this way, it is easy to
see that while LLP legislation protects non-culpable partners from an
obvious injustice, it also can create an injustice for creditors of the
partnership. Consequently, whenever the situation arises where part-
ners are to determine whether partnership assets are to be used in
order to satisfy both a malpractice claim and the ordinary business
obligations of the partnership, tensions between competing interests
will inevitably arise.2°5
B. Consequences of a Lawsuit Under the New York/Minnesota Model
While the Texas/Delaware style LLP statutes could potentially
leave legitimate victims of attorney malpractice without a sufficiently
"deep pocket" to cover their loss, the New York/Minnesota style stat-
utes raise even greater ethical concerns. 206 In an attempt to limit the
partner conflicts which inevitably arise under the Texas/Delaware
model, the New York/Minnesota statutes include an added provision
which shields all partners from any form of liability incurred solely by
reason of being a partner. 207 Thus, in addition to the protection which
205 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1080.
204 See id.; see also U.S. v. Vineyard, 699 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (defendant partner
ordered to pay restitution).
2°5 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1079. Outside of judicially created rules to govern a fair
and equitable division of partnership assets, there seems to be no easy answer to this problem.
Unfortunately, since, for all intents and purposes, these situations are resolved through settle-
ment, such rules have not been created. See generally Murphy, supra note 102, at 202.
2°6 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1103.
2°7 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(2) (West 1995); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1997). Specifically, this provision states:
(Nlo partner of a partnership which is a registered limited liability partnership is
liable or accountable, „ for any debts, obligations or liabilities of, or chargeable
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non-culpable partners receive from malpractice judgments levied
against the partnership, all partners receive protection from personal
liability for the ordinary business debts and obligations of the partner-
ship, 2°8 In effect, this added provision turned partnership law as gov-
erned by the UPA upside-down. 209
As with the Texas/Delaware model, the New York/Minnesota LLP
model does not protect the assets of the partnership entity. 21° It does,
however, insulate all of the partners from personal liability for any
ordinary business debts or obligations which have not yet been paid. 2 "
As a result, this added provision could potentially leave many of the
firm's creditors without any means of recovering payment of outstand-
ing firm debts. 212
Consequently, non-culpable partners have gone from a situation
where they were jointly and severally liable for all debts chargeable to
the partnership, to a situation where they have little personal expo-
sure.213 While all of this protection comes at an extremely minimal cost
to the partners themselves, it does, however, impose a serious cost upon
parties who conduct business with such a LLP.214 Thus, potential credi-
tors of LLPs bear a substantial risk that they will be unable to recover
their debts if the partnership should colIapse. 2 "
C. The Massachusetts Solution
Because the Massachusetts Legislature chose to follow the New
York/Minnesota model, Massachusetts attorneys practicing in the LLP
form are insulated from personal liability both for the wrongful acts of
fellow partners and representatives of the firm as well as for the ordi-
nary business obligations of the LLP itself. 216 To determine whether the
Massachusetts statute provides a workable solution to the problem of
to, the registered limited liability partnership or each other, whether arising in tort,
contract or otherwise, which are incurred, created or assumed by such partnership
... solely by reason of being a partner ....
N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(b).
2°8 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(2); N.Y. PARTNERSI III' LAW § 26(b).
233
 See supra notes 81-87 and accompanying text
21 ° See DEL. Coia ANN. tit. 6, § 1515(b) (1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(2); N.Y. PART-
NERSHIP LAw § 26(b);
	 REV. Cm STAT. ANN. art. 6132h, § 15(a) (West Supp. 1997).
211 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(2); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP Law § 26(b).
212 See Hamilton, .supra note 28, at 1103.
213 Compare N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26, with § 26(6).
214 Seee. Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1094.
215 See id. For this reason virtually every LLP statute contains a provision requiring the UP
to indicate its status on firm letterhead and other official documents. See, e.g., MASS. CNN. LAWS
ch. 108A, § 46 (Sum), 1995).
216 See MASS. GEN. Laws ch. 108A, § 15(b) (2).
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unlimited attorney liability, it is necessary to examine three aspects of
the Massachusetts statute which raise questions as to whether it pro-
vides a workable solution to the problem of unlimited lawyer liability.
The first ethical shortcoming of the Massachusetts statute is that,
unlike most other LLP statutes, it fails to contain a provision holding
partners liable for the negligence or wrongful acts of persons over
which they had direct control. 217 Some states not only contain such a
principle, but in fact have even extended it to situations where a
partner may not have direct control over the culpable employee, but
does have knowledge of the wrongdoings and fails to take reasonable
action to remedy them. 218
 While such a rule may create problems of
degree as to what constitutes "direct control" or "reasonable action,"
such standards of reasonableness have been readily applied in other
areas of law with a great deal of success by using judicial interpreta-
tion. 21g Thus, it seems plausible that a workable rule could and prob-
ably will be established in the future by judges in those states which
employ such language in their statutes. 22"
The costs of such an omission in the text of the statute could
potentially prove extremely high. Holding partners liable for the neg-
ligence of those who work for or with them encourages diligent super-
vision on the part of the partners, thus reducing the potential for
malpractice. 221
 It therefore seems anomalous that the Massachusetts
LLP act purposely fails to include such a provision. 222
The second ethical shortcoming with the Massachusetts LLP act
is the major provision which shields partners from personal liability for
the ordinary business obligations of the partnership. 223
 This provision,
created by the New York/Minnesota LLP model, has become extremely
popular. 224
 While this provision makes the LLP an even more attractive
business option for Massachusetts' partnerships, it is difficult to find a
compelling justification for it.
The principal problem with this provision is that the solution it
proposes proves far broader than the problem itself. 225 Specifically, this
217
 See, id. § 15.
219 See Din.. Com: ANN. tit. 6, § 1515(c) (1903); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(2) (West 1995);
N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 26(b); TEX. REV. C/V. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 15(b) (West Supp. 1997).
219 See generally Kansallis Finance Ltd. v. Fern, 659 N.E.2c1 731 (Mass. 1996).
22° See id.
221 See Murphy, .supra note 102, at 215.
222 See, MASS. CNN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 15(b) (2).
223 See id.
224 See. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 323.14(2) (West 1995); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW 26(b) (McKinney
Supp. 1997).
225 See MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 15(b) (2); Hamilton, 51111ra note 28, at 1090-91.
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increased shield from liability protects not only innocent partners from
the misdeeds of other "bad apple" partners, but it also protects the
entire partnership from itself. 226 Inherent in the text of the Massachu-
setts statute is the assumption that the majority of partnerships that
collapse do so because of malpractice and other similar lawsuits di-
rected against a partner or partners.'" It would be more accurate, how-
ever, to assume that the collapse of most partnerships happens under
the weight of problems not associated with a malpractice claim. 228 This
Massachusetts legislation would allow all of the partners in a collapsed
partnership to avoid personal liability for over-hiring, overextending,
entering into a disastrous long term lease or a myriad of other poorly
conceived business decisions. 229 Such a result cannot adequately be
supported by either the underlying theory of LLP law or common
sense in general. As a result, it seems that this provision of the Massa-
chusetts LLP legislation proves to be a pretext for quietly allowing all
partners to obtain limited liability for their own business mistakes
without having anyone find out about it.230
Another injustice created by this provision is the impact that it has
on parties who contract with LLPs. 23 t Commentators have suggested
that experienced and sophisticated lenders such as banks and real
estate developers will probably be able to contract for personal liability
of the partners. 232 A problem with this analysis arises in the context of
parties who are not nearly as sophisticated."'" For every commercial
lender and real estate developer there are just as many unsophisticated
businesses, such as the local hardware store or cleaning service, that
will enter into contracts with LLPs unaware of the fact that the three
letters "LLP" have completely changed the allocation of the risk that
the partnership will prove unable to satisfy its debt. 234 This will become
even more prevalent as the popularity of LLPs spreads beyond the
realm of law and accounting firms and into the millions of small
general partnerships who will be able to attain this protection from
liability for a mere five-hundred dollars a year."'"
226 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1091.
227 See MASS. GEN. Lams ch. 108A, § 15.
228 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1091 (suggesting other reasons why a partnership may
collapse).
229 See MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 108A, § 15; Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1091.
289 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. lOBA, § 15; Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1091.
231 See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
282 See Hamilton, supra mite 28, al. 1092; Cohen, .supra note 109, at 1.
233 See Hamilton, supra note 28, at 1093.
231 See id. at 1093-94.
235 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A, § 45(3).
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There is, however, a third aspect of the Massachusetts LLP legis-
lation which helps to counterbalance some of the inequity it creates in
practice. 236
 The Massachusetts LLP statute holds partners in LLPs to
the same standard as shareholders in a professional corporation, by
mandating that partners cannot distribute the firm's profits to them-
selves unless they have enough partnership capital available to satisfy
the partnership's ordinary business obligations. 237 This provision basi-
cally ensures that professionals, such as lawyers and accountants, will
not use their knowledge and sophistication to manipulate the partner-
ship assets in a way that could intentionally or knowingly defraud a
creditor.238
 This provision, however, does nothing to remedy situations
where creditors go unpaid because the partnership has collapsed for
legitimate reasons. 239
 While this provision does not cure the fundamen-
tal flaws inherent in this LLP legislation, it does at least address the
fact that intentional abuse of the LLP shield will not be tolerated."'
In sum, the Massachusetts LLP legislation proves far too broad a
solution for addressing the problem of unlimited attorney liability in
the commonwealth."' The legislature erred in adopting this expansive
New York/Minnesota style LLP statute because it unnecessarily and
unjustly shifts the risk that the collapse of the partnership will prevent
the payment of ordinary business obligations from the partners to the
firm's creditors.242
 Massachusetts would have been wiser to base its LLP
legislation on the Texas/Delaware mode1. 243
 While this model does not
fully protect non-culpable partners from the indirect effects of a mal-
practice judgment levied against the firm, it does, however, more
equitably balance the allocation of the risk between the firm's partners
and its creditors should a partnership prove unable to satisfy its debt. 244
CONCLUSION
The number of law firms which have chosen to adopt the LLP
form is steadily increasing. 245
 Invariably, as more and more firms realize
the benefits of organizing under the LLP form this trend will only
236 See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
237 See MASS. GEN. Laws ch., 108A, 15; see also supra note 148 and accompanying text.
238 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 108A § 15(4).
239 See id.
240 see id.
241 See supra notes 226-40 and accompanying text.
242 See supra notes 216-240 and accompanying text.
241
 See id.
244 See id.
245 See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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accelerate.24' As the various state-specific LLP statutes are currently
written, there is no reason why a general partnership law firm would
not choose to register as a LLP. 247
LLPs in their original conception represent an equitable solution
to the problem of unlimited attorney liability by providing non-culpa-
ble partners with a shield from personal liability for the wrongful acts
of fellow partners."' The recent trend in LLP statutes which extends
this shield to cover all ordinary business obligations of the partnership
is an unreasonable extension of the original principle. 149 Commenta-
tors have suggested that as time goes on statutes such as the Massachu-
setts LLP Act will be viewed by the public as "legislation for lawyers." 25"
In turn, these statutes will only perpetuate the pejorative stereotypes
of attorneys which currently pervade society.
As this becomes the case, it will be the responsibility of both clients
and creditors of law firms to educate themselves as to the extent of the
law and to closely monitor the affairs of the LLPs with which they
conduct business. 251 As time passes, it seems inevitable that many of
these businesses will become more sophisticated in their dealings with
LLP law firms by contracting for the personal liability of the partners
themselves. 252 While the current LLP statute has succeeded in shifting
the default rule of personal liability as it previously applied to all
partnerships, it is possible that the inequities associated with this situ-
ation can be avoided through a higher level of sophistication on the
part of both attorneys and their clients. 253
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2411 See supra notes 179-216 and accompanying text.
217 See supra notes 91-221 and accompanying text.
2 '15 See supra notes 43-77 and accompanying text.
2 A 9 See supra notes 207-41 and accompanying text.
250 See, e.g., Hamilton, .supra note 28, at 1103; Weld[Heti, su/na note 26, at 1.
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252 See id.
259 See id.
